This judgment matters because antispeciesist ethical veganism is a comprehensive moral framework. It’s one the state can no longer dismiss as mere lifestyle choice
In a first, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has held ethical veganism meets the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance for protection under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of religion, thought, conscience).
The case
On 16 July 2026, the ECHR delivered a significant judgment in G.K. and A.S. v. Switzerland (applications nos. 55299/20 and 31515/22).
Two Swiss nationals, one of whom was in pre-trial detention and the other was in involuntary psychiatric hospitalisation, were unable to secure fully vegan diets during their respective periods of state custody.
The first applicant (G.K.) was detained at Champ-Dollon Prison for nearly a year. He repeatedly requested vegan meals, citing his antispeciesist beliefs. The prison offered a vegetarian menu, extra portions, and access to a limited prison shop, but no systematic vegan provision. He was served polenta with dairy cream, lasagna with dairy ricotta, fish with cream sauce. On some days, he simply couldn’t eat.
The second applicant (A.S.) had been vegan for 16 years. During his involuntary hospitalisation, he was served non-vegan meals and protein-deficient dishes. When he tried to raise the issue, he hit a wall.
The procedural trap
Both applicants tried to challenge the failure to accommodate their diets and failed on procedure not merits.
The authorities responded to their complaints with letters, not formal “decisions” which could be appealed. The prison replied: “We have taken measures to ensure you can benefit from a diet which accommodates your beliefs as well as possible.” The hospital replied: “We are forwarding your request to the head of your care unit.”
When the applicants tried to appeal these letters, the domestic courts declared their appeals inadmissible because there had been no formal decision. Therefore, if no formal decision, then no way to appeal and consequently no examination of the merits of the claims.
The first applicant explicitly requested a formal decision to change his diet. He got another letter. The second applicant explicitly requested a “declaratory decision” acknowledging his right to vegan meals. He also received a letter.
Their vegan beliefs were simply not taken seriously by the authorities and the courts had nothing to base their decisions on.
What the ECHR Found
1. Ethical veganism is a protected belief under Article 9
The ECHR held the applicants’ vegan convictions met the required level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance to fall within the scope of freedom of thought and conscience:
“The observance of dietary rules dictated by genuine and consistently held vegan beliefs is a practice protected by Article 9 § 1 of the Convention.” (para. 120)
The ECHR drew on previous recognition of veganism by the European Commission (W. v. UK, 1993) and noted that Council of Europe member States increasingly treat veganism as a non-religious belief. It also referenced comparative rulings in Germany, Italy, the UK, where ethical veganism has been recognised as a philosophical belief.
And to be absolutely clear, the ECHR recognised this isn’t about religion; it’s about strongly held conviction which has a coherent framework shaping daily life and a recognition that opposing the exploitation of sentient beings is an ethical position, not merely a dietary preference.
2. The domestic remedies were ineffective (Article 13)
The ECHR found the way Swiss authorities applied domestic law made it practically impossible for the applicants to obtain the administrative “decisions” needed for merits examination. The approach was, in the ECHR’s words, “excessively formalistic” and showed “the applicants’ complaints were not taken seriously.”
3. Positive obligations under Article 9 were violated
The authorities failed to provide a substantive examination of the applicants’ grievances. The domestic courts’ findings concerned technical admissibility only; never the substance of whether vegan diets should have been provided.
The ECHR emphasised: faced with consistent, genuine vegan beliefs, authorities must address the requests in substance and within a clear domestic legal framework.
Why this matters for antispeciesist ethical veganism
I’ve written plenty about antispeciesist veganism being a comprehensive ethical framework and this judgement affirms that understanding. Veganism is not a diet, not a lifestyle, but a coherent ethical position grounded in the recognition of the inherent individuality and autonomy of other animals and that using and exploiting them is simply unjustified, just like we would recognise that individuality, autonomy and injustice with respect to human animals.
The ECHR didn’t question the validity of the applicants’ vegan beliefs. It didn’t require them to prove veganism was true or correct. It simply assessed whether their convictions were genuine, consistent, and serious enough to warrant protection, and found they were.
This matters because:
- It places ethical veganism alongside other protected philosophical convictions—pacifism, conscientious objection, secularism, and opposition to abortion. Veganism is no longer on the margins of human rights law.
- It recognises veganism is identity-forming. The ECHR noted the applicants’ beliefs shaped their daily choices, not just what they ate, but how they understood their relationship with other animals. The Vegan Society’s intervention described veganism as “a daily lived expression of ethical commitment.” Kudos to the Vegan Society (and Vegan Australia and the Criminal Law Research Center of the Free University of Brussels) for their interventions!!
- It affirms the state cannot dismiss veganism as a mere preference. When a person is in state custody, whether that’s prison or psychiatric hospital, in this case, the state has a positive obligation to respect their ethical convictions. This isn’t about catering to special interests. It’s about recognising that freedom of conscience protected under Article 9 applies equally to those who hold the exploitation of animals is fundamentally wrong.
The vegan duty in practice
The ECHR didn’t rule that every prison or hospital must offer a vegan menu. It acknowledged states have a margin of appreciation and that organisational, financial, and nutritional constraints must be considered.
But the ECHR did say when faced with genuine vegan beliefs, authorities must engage with the request in substance. They can’t dodge it with procedural technicalities. They can’t hide behind letters that aren’t “decisions.” They must strike a fair balance between the individual’s convictions and institutional constraints. And that balance must be struck explicitly, reasonably, and with proper judicial oversight.
This aligns with the ECHR’s finding that the majority of Council of Europe member states agree on “the necessity to take requests for such diets into account.” (para. 125)
The question isn’t whether veganism deserves recognition. The question is how that recognition should be implemented and it’s clear from this decision that implementation must be substantive, not evasive.
The Dissent
Judge Grigoryan dissented, arguing the applications should have been declared inadmissible and there were no violations of Articles 9 or 13.
It’s worth noting what the dissent doesn’t contest. Even the dissenting judge doesn’t appear to question whether ethical veganism could qualify as a protected belief. The disagreement seems to centre on whether the applicants had exhausted domestic remedies and whether the ECHR should have intervened.
This suggests the core principle of veganism being a protected belief under Article 9 is not in serious dispute.
Beyond the case
This judgment matters for vegan advocacy because it provides a legal foundation for veganism as a protected belief. In contexts where vegans face discrimination or exclusion, for example in prisons, hospitals, schools, or workplaces, this ruling may strengthen the case for reasonable accommodation.
It also matters for how we think about veganism itself. Veganism has been capitalised and many easily dismissed it as a diet, preference or simply a consumer choice; nothing important, only something optional, trivial, undeserving of the same respect as other serious and firmly held convictions. This judgment challenges that framing. It recognises opposing the exploitation of animals is an ethical and lifelong commitment, which can be as deep and as identity-forming as any conviction.
The judgment also underscores a broader truth: the state cannot use procedural barriers to avoid its obligations to those in its care. When a person is in state custody, they’re vulnerable, can’t provide for themselves and they rely on the state for food, shelter, and dignity. If the state fails to respect their deeply held convictions, it must be accountable, not hidden behind administrative procedures.
And all of this is a significant step forward. What’s left for us to do is to continue to live with the courage of our convictions. No matter how hard or futile they may seem or society wants us to believe they are, our antispeciesist vegan convictions are what will change the world.
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